Introduction
The ongoing discussion on how to manage risks has been revitalized lately for at least two reasons. Primarily, many large institutional investors, that control roughly 75 percent of the world's publicly listed companies' shareholdings (Ward, 2001) , have lost large sums of money on poorly managed multinationals in the last two decades. As a response, Codes of Conduct on corporate governance have been developed. In the UK the so-called Turnbull Report has been made at the request of the London Stock Exchange (LSE), and``The (Turnbull) guidance is about the adoption of a risk-based approach to establishing a system of internal control and reviewing its effectiveness'' (Jones and Sutherland, 1999) . It became a mandatory requirement for all companies listed at the LSE before 2001 (see Jones and Sutherland, 1999) , and according to Ward (2001) around 30 countries are looking at similar arrangements, most of them on a voluntary basis as of today.
This push from the institutional investors brings risk management out from the confinement of the engineer's cubicle or of the stockbroker's desk to become a central element for the board of directors because it will directly impact a corporation's capability to attract investors. In the words of Ward (2001): What is common to almost all governance guidelines and codes of best practice, is that the board assumes responsibility for the stewardship of the corporation and that board responsibilities are distinct from management responsibilities. They merely differ, in the level of specificity with which they explain the board's role on issues such as strategic planning; risk identification and management; succession planning; communication with shareholders and the integrity of financial reporting.
Second, the accelerating change in the business environment is another crucial reason why risk management is becoming increasingly important. In fact, Jones and Sutherland (1999) assert that``a major risk exposure and source of business failure and/ or lack of opportunity success has been the failure to manage change''. Arguably, the business environment evolves too rapidly to rely on the``rearview mirror'' approach. Consequently, we believe decision makers are increasingly left in situations where they must act without relevant experience. Thus, they must first acquire knowledge to effectively reflect upon their existing experiences and learn from Confucius (Analects 7, p. 27):
There are those who act without knowing, I will have none of this. To learn a lot, choose the good, and follow it, to see a lot and learn to recognize it; this is next to knowledge.
Arguably, the many corporations that failed in the last two decades were run by experienced people who``acted without knowing'' to paraphrase Confucius. We believe effective risk management can enable decision makers to increase their knowledge about their options in times of uncertainty and thus reduce their risk of business failure. Hence, there is a strong need to manage all the risks in a company ± the business risks ± and not just financial risks which normally get most attention from the board, or technical and environmental risks, which get most attention from engineers.
In this paper we focus on strategic risks, which may be greater than the risks most companies track, report and manage (see Section 2.1). We investigate situations on a strategic level because they are usually complex and lack information, and currently there is also a lack of risk decision-support in strategy (see e.g. Courtney, 2001) . In fact, the outlining of a strategy can equally well be compared to formulating a risk profile, because``the risk taking strategy is an essential part of the total strategy'' (Noy, 1998) and``risk acceptance characteristics are essential to the success of many strategies'' (Noy, 2001) . This is particularly crucial for innovative organizations since innovation is inherently uncertain (Emblemsva Ê g and Bras, 2000) and often associated with great financial risk since the capital needs are often substantial (Schneiderman, 1996) . We present our approach by first discussing some important background material in Section 2 concerning risk and uncertainty. Then, we provide our definition of``strategic risk''. In Section 3 the strategic risk analysis (SRA) approach is presented, followed by a case in Section 4. A closure is found in Section 5.
Risk and uncertainty
Risk and uncertainty are often used interchangeably. For example, Friedlob and Schleifer (1999) claim that for auditors``risk is uncertainty''. It may be that distinguishing between risk and uncertainty makes little sense for auditors, but the fact is that there are many basic differences as explained next.
We first discuss risk from traditional perspectives, and we look at the sources of risks. Then, the concept of uncertainty is explored. The discussions on risk and uncertainty provide the clues needed to define``strategic risk'', which is done in Section 2.4.
Risk
The word``risk'' derives from the early Italian word risicare, which originally means`t o dare''. In this sense risk is a choice rather than a fate (Bernstein, 1996) . Other definitions also imply a choice aspect. Risk as a general noun is defined as``exposure to the chance of injury or loss; a hazard or dangerous chance'' (Webster, 1989) . By the same token, in statistical decision theory risk is defined as``the expected value of a loss function'' (Hines and Montgomery, 1990) . Thus, various definitions of risk imply that we expose ourselves to risk by choice. Risk is measured, however, in terms of`c onsequences and likelihood'' (Standards Australia, 1999; Robbins and Smith, 2001) where likelihood is understood as à`q ualitative description of probability or frequency'', but frequency theory is dependent on probability theory (Honderich, 1995) . Thus, risk is ultimately a probabilistic phenomenon as it is defined in most literature.
It is important to emphasize that``risk is not just bad things happening, but also good things not happening'' (Jones and Sutherland, 1999 ) ± a clarification that is particularly crucial in SRA. Many companies do not fail from primarily taking``wrong actions'', but from not capitalizing on their opportunities, i.e. the loss of an opportunity. As Drucker (1986) observes,``The effective business focuses on opportunities rather than problems''. Risk management is ultimately about being proactive.
Risk is perceived differently in relation to gender, age and culture. On average, women are more risk averse than men, and more experienced managers are more risk averse than younger ones (MacCrimmon and Wehrung, 1986) . Furthermore, evidence suggests that successful managers take more risk than unsuccessful managers. Perhaps there are ties between the young managers'`c ontemporary competence'' and his exposure to risks and success? At any rate, our ability to identify risks is limited by our perceptions of risks. This is important to be aware of when identifying risks, and many examples of sources of risks are found in Government Asset Management Committee (2001) and Jones and Sutherland (1999) .
According to a 1999 Deloitte & Touche survey the potential failure of strategy is one of the greatest risks. Another is the failure to innovate. Unfortunately, such formulations have limited usefulness in managing risks as explained later ± is``failure of strategy'' a risk or a consequence of a risk? To provide an answer we must first look into the concept of uncertainty since``the source of risk is uncertainty'' (Peters, 1999) . This derives from the fact that risk is a choice rather than a fate and occurs whenever there is one-to-many relations between a decision and possible future outcomes (see Figure 1) .
We would like to emphasize that it is important to distinguish between the concept of probability, measures of probability and probability theory as explained by Emblemsva Ê g (2002) . There is much dispute about the subject matter of probability (see Honderich, 1995) . We subscribe to the idea that probability is a``degree of belief'', but that it can be measured in several ways, of which the classical probability calculus of Pascal and others is the best known. For simplicity and generality we prefer the definition of risk found in Webster (1989) ± the``exposure to the chance of injury or loss; a hazard or dangerous chance'' ± while we suggest measuring risk in terms of``degree of impact and degree of belief''.
The basic tenet of this paper is that we believe there are situations where classic probability calculus may prove deceptive in risk analyses. This is not to say, however, that probability theory should be discarded altogether ± we simply believe that probability theory and other theories can complement each other if we understand when to use what. In the context of SRA, we argue that other theories provide a better point of departure than the classic probability theory. To introduce these other theories we first explore the concept of uncertainty, which is done next.
Uncertainty
Uncertainty as a general noun is defined as`t he state of being uncertain; doubt; hesitancy'' (Webster, 1989) . Thus, there is neither loss nor gain necessarily associated with uncertainty; it is simply the not known with certainty ± not the unknown.
Some define uncertainty as``the inability to assign probability to outcomes'', and risk is regarded as the``ability to assign such probabilities based on differing perceptions of the existence of orderly relationships or patterns'' (Gilford, 1979) . We find such definitions too simplistic for our purpose because in most business situations the relationships or patterns are not orderly; they are complex. Thus, uncertainty and complexity are intertwined and as an unpleasant side effect, imprecision emerges. Lotfi A. Zadeh (1965) formulated this fact in a theorem called the Law of Incompatibility (McNeill and Freiberger, 1993) :
As complexity rises, precise statements lose meaning and meaningful statements lose precision.
Since all organizations experience some degree of complexity, this theorem is crucial to understand and act in accordance. With complexity we refer to the state in which the cause-and-effect relationships are loose, for example, operating a sailboat. A mechanical clock, however, in which the relationship between the parts is precisely defined, is complicated ± not complex. From the Law of Incompatibility we understand that there are limits to how precise decision support both can and should be (to avoid deception), due to the inherent uncertainty caused by complexity. By increasing the uncertainty in analyses and other decision support material to better reflect the true and inherent uncertainty will lower the actual risk.
In fact, Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow warns us that``[O]ur knowledge of the way things work, in society or in Nature, comes trailing clouds of vagueness. Vast ills have followed a belief in certainty'' (Arrow, 1992) . Basically, ignoring complexity and/or uncertainty is risky, and accuracy may be deceptive. The NRC Governing Board on the Assessment of Risk shares a similar view (see Zimmer, 1986) . Thus, striking a sound balance between meaningfulness and precision is crucial, and possessing a relatively clear understanding of uncertainty is needed since uncertainty and complexity is so closely related.
There are two main types of uncertainty, (see Figure 1 ), fuzziness and ambiguity. Definitions in the literature differ slightly but are more or less consistent with Figure 1 . Fuzziness occurs whenever definite, sharp, clear or crisp distinctions are not made.
Ambiguity results from unclear definitions of the various alternatives (outcomes). These alternatives can either be in conflict with each other or they can be unspecified. The former is ambiguity resulting from discord whereas the latter is ambiguity resulting from nonspecificity. The ambiguity resulting from discord is essentially what probability theory focus on, because``probability theory can model only situations where there are conflicting beliefs about mutually exclusive alternatives'' (Klir, 1991) . In fact, neither fuzziness nor nonspecificity can be conceptualized by probability theories that are based on the idea of``equipossibility'' because such theories are``digital'' in the sense that degree of occurrence is not allowed ± it either occurs or not. Put differently, uncertainty is a too wide concept for classical probability theory, because it is closely linked to equipossibility theory (see Honderich, 1995) . Kangari and Riggs (1989) have discussed the various methods used in risk analysis and classified them as either``classical'' (probability based) or``conceptual'' (fuzzy set based). Their findings are similar to ours:
. . . probability models suffer from two major limitations. Some models require detailed quantitative information, which is not normally available at the time of planning, and the applicability of such models to real project risk analysis is limited, because agencies participating in the project have a problem with making precise decisions. The problems are ill-defined and vague, and they thus require subjective evaluations, which classical models cannot handle.
To deal with both fuzziness and nonspecific ambiguity, however, Zadeh invented fuzzy sets ±``the first new method of dealing with uncertainty since the development of probability'' (Zadeh, 1965) ± and the associated possibility theory. Fuzzy sets and possibility theory handles the widest scope of uncertainty, and so must SRA. Thus, these theories seem to offer a sound point of departure for our SRA.
For our purpose, however, the discussion revolves around how we estimate probability, and not the calculus that follows. In this context possibility theory offers some important ideas explained in Section 2.3. Similar ideas seem also to have been absorbed by a type of probability theory denoted``subjective probability theory'' (see e.g. Roos, 1998) . In fact, in our work we need not distinguish between possibility theory and subjective probability theory because the main difference between those theories lies in the calculus, but the difference in calculus is of no interest to us. This is due to the fact that we only use the probability estimates to rank the risks and do not perform any calculus, but since possibility theory provides the origin of the ideas we use possibility theory terminology.
In the remainder of this paper we use the term``classic probability theory'' to separate it from subjective probability theory.
Probability theory versus possibility theory
For our work the crux of the difference between classic probability theory and possibility theory lies in the estimation of a probability. For example, consider the Venn diagram in Figure 2 . The two outcomes A and B in outcome space S overlap, i.e. they are not mutually exclusive. The probability of A is in other words dependent on the probability of B, and vice versa. This situation is denoted nonspecific ambiguity in Figure 1 .
In classic probability theory we look at A in relation to S and correct for overlaps so that the sum of all outcomes will be 100 percent (all exhaustible). In theory this is straightforward, but in practice calculating the probability of A B is problematic in cases where A and B are interdependent and the underlying cause-and-effect relations are complex. Thus, in such cases we find that the larger the probability of A B, the larger may the mistake of using classic probability theory become.
In possibility theory, however, we simply look at the outcomes in relation to each other, and consequently S becomes irrelevant and overlaps do not matter. The possibility of A will simply be A to A + B in Figure 2 . Clearly, possibility theory is intuitive and easy, but we pay a price ± loss of precision (an outcome in comparison to outcome space) both in definition (as discussed here) and in its further calculus operations (not discussed here). This loss of precision is, however, more true to high levels of complexity and that is crucial when talking about strategy because``firms are mutually dependent'' (Porter, 1998) . Also, it is important that risk management approaches do not appear more reliable than they are because then decision makers can be led to accept decisions they normally would reject (see Bernstein, 1996) .
This discussion clearly illustrates that`[ classic] probabilistic approaches are based on counting whereas possibilistic logic is based on relative comparison'' (Dubois et al., 1992) . There are also other differences between classic probability theory and possibility theory, which is beyond the scope of this paper and our approach. It should be noted that in several places in the literature the word``probability'' is used in cases that are clearly possibilistic. This is probably more due to the fact that``probability'' is a common word ± which has double meaning (Bernstein, 1996) ± than reflecting an actual usage of classic probability theory and calculus.
One additional difference that is pertinent to our work is the difference between``event'' and``sensation''. The term``event'' applied in probability theory requires a certain level of distinctiveness in defining what is occurring and what is not.``The term`sensation' has therefore been proposed in possibility theory, and it is something weaker than an event'' (Kaufmann, 1983) . We believe the idea behind`s ensation'' is important in strategic settings because in strategic management being as distinct as the definition of``event'' requires is not always recommendable.
Also, we prefer the term``possibility'' over`p robability'' to emphasize that positive risks ± opportunities, or possibilities in common language ± should be pursued actively. Furthermore, using a possibilistic foundation (based on relative ordering as opposed to the absolute counting in classic probability theory) provides added decision support because``one needs to present comparison scenarios that are located on the probability scale to evoke people's own feeling of risk'' (Kunreuther et al., 2001) . This is particularly true for low probability risks, and many strategic risks are loẁ`p robability'' risks because the number of potential sensations of a decision is so vast.
To summarize Sections 2.1 ± 2.3: We use the Webster (1989) definition of risk ± thè`e xposure to the chance of injury or loss; a hazard or dangerous chance'' ± while we measure risk in terms of``degree of impact'' and``degree of belief''. Furthermore, we use the word``possibility'' to denote our estimate about the degree of belief of a specific sensation. The estimate itself is established mathematically by relative (pair-wise) comparison. Relative comparison also applies when estimating the degree of impact if it is difficult to establish a common baseline, but to keep it simple we use the term``impact'' regardless of how it is estimated.
Using these definitions, we proceed a step further and discuss``strategic'' risk.
What is a strategic risk?
To discuss strategic risk, we must first define the word``strategy'' because``strategic'' means according to Webster (1989) `p ertaining to, characterized by, or of the nature of strategy''. In business literature, there is abundant usage of the term`s trategy'' and it has become``. . . among the most sloppily used terms in business . . .'' (Magretta, 2002) . We prefer to adapt the definition of strategy found in On War, which according to Louise Willmot has been described as``the only truly great book on its subject'' (war) ± see von Clausewitz (1997). Carl von Clausewitz defines strategy as``the employment of the battle as the means towards the attainment of the object of the war''. This is a military definition. From that definition, but in a business context, we define strategy as``the employment of competition as the means to attain business objectives''. In other words, a strategy describes how an organization is to attain its business objectives by competing against others. Thus, a strategy cannot be defined without also defining the competition. The term``competitive strategy'' introduced by Porter (1998) is therefore strictly speaking a pleonasm in our opinion.
This competition against others in pursuit of objectives exposes the organization to both expected and unexpected sensations that are associated with risks. These risks we refer to as strategic risks. Consequently, we define strategic risks as``risks that arise in pursuit of business objectives''. In other words, many strategic issues basically exist in a state of uncertainty from which strategic risks (and other business risks) can emerge as objectives are pursued.
Having defined strategic risks, we must decide how to measure such risks in order to operationalize our approach. Evidently, we hold that strategic risks are fuzzy and/or nonspecific ambiguous. This is further substantiated by the claim of Porter (1998) that;``firms are mutually dependent''. Thus, strategic risks are not probabilistic (in the calculus sense) because they are not necessarily all exhaustible nor mutually exclusive. The measure of risk discussed earlier, used by Standards Australia (1999), Robbins and Smith (2001) therefore inappropriate. Given these findings we propose to measure strategic risks as; Strategic risk = possibility x impact on business objectives
To our knowledge, using the term``risk'' in this context is novel because we are dealing with possibilities and not classic probabilities as Courtney (2001) and most others do. Also, we find our definition of strategic risk and how we propose to measure it logical, sound and well adapted to the reality surrounding strategic processes as argued in Sections 2.1 and 2.3.
Next, we present our approach, and for simplicity we refer to strategic risk as``risk'' in the remainder of this paper.
The strategic risk analysis approach
As we define it, strategic risks arise in pursuit of business objectives ± either by exploiting opportunities and/or reducing threats. How these risks can be managed is determined by the organizational characteristics ± the strengths and weaknesses. We therefore believe that combining characteristics and risks is a crucial aspect of risk management as well as strategy. For our purpose, this cross-linkage of characteristics and risks is referred to as`t he SWOT principles''. Interestingly, the literature on risk seems to ignore this point, while literature on strategy discusses characteristics frequently. What we try to do here is to bring those two perspectives ± risk and characteristics ± together in a best possible way in order to attain business objectives.
Since SWOT plays an important part of our overall framework, we briefly describe a standard SWOT analysis followed by the steps of our SRA approach. SRA is the analysis part of the strategic risk management (SRM) process, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
A brief overview of the SWOT analysis
A strengths, weakness, opportunity and threat (SWOT) analysis is a``handy mnemonic that help planners think about corporate strategy'', and it``. . . can be applied to many different aspects of a company's business . . .'' (Hindle, 2000) . It starts by identifying the strengths and weaknesses of the business unit and the opportunities and threats it faces. Depending on the current situation weights are assigned to signify importance.
The analysis lies along two main axes: internal (S and W) versus external (O and T); and positive (S and O) versus negative (W and T). A SWOT matrix is defined to provide strategic decision support and four generic strategies can be devised (see Figure 3) .
Obviously, a SWOT analysis is a relatively simple, inaccurate, open-ended technique. However, the Law of Incompatibility suggests that SWOT analyses are one of those tools that are useful in complex situations.
The steps
Our SRA approach consists of four steps that are explained briefly in the following: 1 Define objectives. 2 Brainstorm risks and characteristics according to the SWOT axis. 3 Calculate possibilities and consequences of the risks. 4 Combine risks with characteristics.
It is important to notice that these four steps must be put in a greater management context (including SRM) and that wording must be adjusted to local jargon.
Step 1 ± define objectives
To clearly define the business objectives is a crucial initial step because if we do not know where we want to go it is difficult to identify what risks may arise. In fact, an unclear business objective is a strategic risk in itself, and should be remedied at this stage.
By reviewing the strategy and plans, and through interviews and a management session on targets and objectives, the business objectives are assessed for clarity. We try to remove as much ambiguity, discord, disagreements and other vagueness as possible. That allows us to define the objectives well.
Step 2 ± brainstorm risk and characteristics according to the SWOT axis
We use the SWOT principles to guide the analysis where the Os and Ts represent risks whereas Ss and Ws are the characteristics of the organization. The analysis involves a brainstorming session, but the brainstorming process has a few challenges, which should be resolved for practical reasons.
First, it is important to define risk to the participants properly. Also, the participants should at this stage not concern themselves with measuring risks. By relating this process to the risk definition ± and not the risk measure ± the participants are invited to think in terms of both opportunities and threats.
Second, questioning wording is useful in helping decision makers express and elaborate on what they really mean. As we have all experienced, it is terribly easy to talk past each other for several reasons. The point is that we should do what we can to avoid that, and questioning the wording is often helpful.
Third, it is important to be aware that people tend to screen risks by unconsciously relating their statements to perceived strengths and weaknesses. Although many facilitators put pride in being impartial and avoid influencing the brainstorming, we believe that the facilities should actively guide the process. Myths and hidden assumptions are basically too common, and hence too crucial to identify, to leave to selfassessment.
Finally, the facilitator should also review significant business information prior to the brainstorming so that she/he can ask penetrating questions. Both risks and characteristics should be identified from the widest possible range of issues, including at least strategy, operations, culture, systems, competence and brand. Although impossible to fully achieve, the issues should be exhausted.
Step 3 ± calculate possibilities and consequences of the risks
The risks are the Os and Ts from Step 2, but we do not yet understand their magnitude, which leads to our risk ranking mechanism. Since possibilities by nature are ordinal, we use ordinal matrices based on pair-wise comparison of all risks to estimate their relative magnitudes. How we do that is discussed more in the case study, but it should be noted that it is necessary to divide the risks into case specific categories containing preferably less than nine risks where the categories are defined by type. The reason is that experiments show that people cannot simultaneously compare more than 7AE2 objects (Miller, 1956) . We can also use ordinal matrices to decide the impact as well or use simple relevant scales.
By multiplying possibility by impact we compute the corresponding risk value. The risk values are then plotted on a curve. Although the actual value is fuzzy in nature, the risks are valid for making priorities. Typically, one should focus on the extreme ends of the curves. Negligible risks are not treated further throughout the SRA process.
Step 4 ± combine risks with characteristics
In line with``the SWOT'' principles, we consider how to best combine Ss and Os, Ss and Ts, Ws and Os and Ws and Ts. The purpose is to identify how the organization can manage, or adapt to, the identified risks. That part plays a key role in our approach ± not directly for the SRA part, but for the entire SRM process because without a strong SRA part the SRM will inevitably be faulty. Thus, here we lay the foundation for taking effective managerial actions using the SRA results.
A spreadsheet with all characteristics along one axis, and all risks on the other, provides a good overview and allows identification of logical pairs. An element (S, W, O or T) from the brainstorming that cannot be combined with any other element is omitted from the further analysis. For example, a characteristic that has not been matched against any risk is irrelevant for SRA. Likewise, a threat (negative risk) that cannot be matched against any organizational characteristic (including intermediate states of strengths and weaknesses) is also irrelevant for most SRA strategies; it must be either accepted or transferred.
Normally, various elements will show up in several places. Strength, for example, may impact many risks. There is a one-to-many relation, often ambiguous. A more problematic situation occurs when a risk matches both strengths and weaknesses. The simplest, but crudest way of dealing with this problem calls for counting which risks have the most strengths or weaknesses tied to them (number of occurrences). Whichever has the highest number of occurrences is the determinant impact. A more sophisticated approach involves weighting of the strengths and weaknesses and computing a weighed average net effect.
These are the steps. To illustrate how SRA works in practice we use a case, which is next.
Case ± how an investor used SRA
The decision maker ± our customer ± is an investor that wants to find out if it is worth investing more into a new-to-the-world transportation concept. He is also concerned about how to attract more investors. A company has been incorporated to bring the new technology to the market, and we basically perform a third-party SRA. Thus, the investor objectives of this SRA (Step 1) are, first, identify if the new concept is viable, and if it is, second, identify how to convince other investors to join.
The viability of the concept was related to five risk categories: 1 finance; 2 technology; 3 organizational (internal); 4 marketing; and 5 communication.
The latter is important in this case because an objective is to attract investors. The strengths and weaknesses were mainly related to the quality and experience of the management team. Despite handling a technological innovation, together we saw the significant risks to be mainly business related and not technological, as will be evident from the analysis next.
The analysis
We followed the steps outlined in Section 3.2 and started by reviewing all available documentation about the technology, business plans, marketing plans and whatever we thought were relevant after the objectives had been clarified. We identified more than 200 risks. Then, we spent about a week with top management, in which we also interviewed the director of a relevant governmental research institute and other parties, for a review of the technology and various communication and marketing related risks.
Based on this information we performed the SWOT (Step 2), after which 39 risks remained significant. The vast reduction in the number of risks occured, as the documentation did not contain all that was relevant. In due course, this fact was established as a specific communication risk.
The next step was to rank the risks. By performing a pair-wise comparison of all risks, we got possibility matrices similar to the weighting matrix for the risk categories shown in Table I . It should be noted that there are many ways of doing this, but we chose an approach that was suitably (im)precise to reflect the inherent uncertainty in the analysis situation.
Since the executives are highly experienced in their industry and have insight information concerning their competitors we choose to not only rank the risks, but to also weight the ranking. We see for example that communication risks are believed to be twice as important as marketing risks. In fact, communication risks are believed to be most crucial at this stage. A similar exercise is then done within each risk category.
The impacts were modeled on a``high'',`m edium'',``low'' scale.``High'' was then given a score of 3 and``low'' a score of 1 whilè`m edium'' was given a score of 2. By multiplying the possibilities and the impacts we got the risk profile shown in Figure 4 . All the risks were negative due to the fact that everything is a matter of survival at this point, i.e. negative losses. Managing the opportunities were deliberately pushed forward in time to``after landing the first contract''.
Proceeding to Step 4, we combine the strategic risks with the characteristics of the organization (S and W). We employ a simple way of matching characteristics with risks using plus and minus. Again, precision was deemed not of the highest importance. Twelve risks increase (+) in severity, 19 risks decrease (±) and seven risks remain the same. Lead-time in sales is longer than expected (±1.6 ±).
. Investors do not find the benefits they are looking for (±1.6 +).
. Listeners misunderstand initial presentation of business plan (±1.6 +).
Thus, the risks polarize. On one hand, risks related to technology and performance decrease, while on the other hand, communication risks are aggravated. This is perhaps surprising, given that most of the people in the company are sales and marketing people with a background from large multinationals.
Clearly, our approach works, but how well? That is discussed next.
Critical evaluation of the SRA approach
We believe that what makes our approach work is that it helps us in identifying the risks without mingling them with characteristics. Although skilled facilitation is important, the method works primarily because it handles (expert) opinions in a structured manner.
By asking the top managers to think of risks as defined earlier, and not the measures of risks ± which is a common mistake ± we avoid long lists of everything that is`p roblematic''. Subsequently, the process of relating risks to characteristics becomes quite simple and provides a straightforward way of identifying suitable risk management strategies, which has not been discussed in this paper.
The potentially most important success factors are that our customers feel that the approach invites a practical level of detail, that the entire SRA process was intuitive; and free of artificial exercises such as assigning numerical probabilities to the risks. The relative comparison is basically easier to relate to and more true to the complexity at hand.
But the SRA, like all risk assessment approaches, is no panacea. First, the SRA approach cannot guard the decision makers against hidden assumptions, beliefs and myths. However, by using thorough approaches such as Activity-Based Costing and Porter's 5 Forces in conjunction with our SRA approach we will get much more reliable input in defining the SWs and OTs, respectively. In this sense, the usage of the SWOT framework is actually a strength because it easily accommodates heavier analytical tools. Second, risks that are ignored, unidentified, unpredictable or simply unknowable cannot be analyzed and subsequently managed. In fact, residual risks are always present, which emphasizes the need for having contingency plans and being responsive. Risk management is basically about managing identified risks while preparing for the unidentified ones in our opinion.
If we look at the limitations that are more specific to the SRA approach we find several. First, skilled facilitation is important because the SRA is susceptible to the``garbage in, garbage out'' problem. Those who desire mathematical rigor may see this as a problem, but we believe that such mathematical rigor can easily become deceptive in strategic contexts due to the inherent complexity. Ideally, we need to find a way of defining risks and characteristics that prevents mixing risks and characteristics because such mixing leads to confusion and is therefore important to avoid. Second, we have in this case deployed a more rigorous approach to the possibility axis than to the characteristic axis. This may be a weakness as it introduces different levels of rigorousness, but it not a major one in our opinion because possibilities are more difficult to assess and hence more in need of rigor.
Third, combining risks and characteristics is done very simplistically using only pluses and minuses. Ideally, we should identify an approach that allows us to also capture the degree of relationship between a risk and a characteristic.
Fourth, we cannot ensure that the pairwise comparison is logically sound and true to reality.
With these limitations in mind we have already started to research some possible solutions. Currently, the matrix system of the Analytical Hierarchical Process (AHP) developed by Saaty (1980) is being investigated. It is based on pair-wise comparison that results in what may be referred to as``subjective probability'' estimates as discussed briefly in this paper. The main reason for trying out AHP is that AHP has an indispensable feature that our approach lacks; namely an internal consistency check. Then, it becomes easier to check the results and ensure that they have a certain level of quality.
We have not talked much about risk management in this paper to keep the paper more focused, but we are in the process of finalizing the entire SRM process. We believe that the SRA provides a good starting-point for effective SRM due to the fact that the approach essentially creates knowledge about the complexity (risks and characteristics) surrounding the attainment of business objectives. Moreover, it does so in a realistic, yet practical, manner as indicated by the case example.
To summarize, we believe our SRA approach has a few novel and indispensable characteristics such as:
. the usage of possibilities (or subjective probabilities);
. the SWOT principles; and . its compliance to the Law of Incompatibility.
These characteristics make it more meaningful in strategic management than most other risk management frameworks in our opinion. Some of the limitations we have listed are common to a variety of risk management approaches, and some we are already in the process of reducing substantially.
Closure
We believe our SRA approach is intuitive and can handle the complexity of strategic risks, because it is based on a theoretical framework of definitions and measures of risk that is simple, yet capable of handling fuzziness and ambiguity. The framework also enables us to link strategic risk with organizational characteristics. Furthermore, we view the lack of mathematical rigor as an advantage because it is replaced by robust and simple pair-wise comparisons. After all, managerial thinking especially at the more senior levels requires intuition and the exercise of subjective judgement in all organizations (Isenberg, 1984) , which mathematics is unlikely to handle without being deceptive.
We seek an approach that can help us distil information and knowledge from various sources to increase our understanding of the strategic risks so that we in turn can make more informed decisions about how to pursue business objectives. Like most approaches, the SRA does not provide solutions per se ± it provides attention directing towards problems and possible solutions. Thus, the best results come about when our approach is coupled with skilled implementation because there is no substitute for understanding.
We believe the SRA approach is a significant step in the right direction towards analyzing strategic risk and preparing decision-makers. In the words of Louis Pasteur:
Chance favors the prepared mind.
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